Now That You Have Accessed the Digital Assets, Don’t Forget to Value Them

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by Jody H. Hall, Paralegal

It is well documented that all of our lives have become more data-driven and we are practically tethered to our electronic devices.  Therefore, it should not be surprising to realize that more and more of our assets, and those of our clients, have a digital component.  What may be surprising, however, is just how much value we place on our digital assets.  Surveys report that the average value of personal digital assets owned by individuals globally ranges from $35,000 – $55,000.

A few key words typed into any search engine, including a review of articles written on this blog, will provide a wealth of information on accessing digital assets, including digital assets in your clients’ estate planning documents, and safeguarding your digital assets inventory.  However, after the client’s death, once we have a list of their digital assets, and have gained access those assets, it is prudent for the probate and trust practitioner to remember to value those assets.  Read more

New Fiduciary Act Brings Both Progress and Uncertainty

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by Matthew S. Skotak

You may have previously read on this blog about digital assets, the impact they have on the administration of trusts and estates, the need for fiduciaries to access digital assets, and the privacy concerns that come along with such access. In order to address these issues, Colorado recently enacted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (“RUFADAA”). This new act became effective on August 10, 2016 and can be found at C.R.S. § 15-1-1501 et seq.

RUFADAA is a significant leap by the State of Colorado to catch up to the digital age.  Prior to the passage of the law, the pervasive use of electronic banking and investing has posed a problem for many fiduciaries. Without the receipt of paper statements, personal representatives, financial agents, trustees and conservators have had a difficult time locating an individual’s assets, sometimes leading to an exhaustive search of several banking and financial institutions before asserts are uncovered. Read more

Seeking Clarity in the Distribution of Mineral Interests from a Decedent’s Estate

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by Andy Lemieux, Elizabeth Meck, and Jessica Schmidt

As any practitioner who has dealt with the distribution of mineral interests from a decedent’s estate knows, dealing with these interests can be tricky and the process is not always clear. This is particularly true when old interests have not been distributed properly at the time of death. Thankfully, recent decisions in Colorado, as well as updates to certain provisions of the Colorado Probate Code, provide some clarity to this process.  A recent decision in Utah also provides clarity about who is entitled to the proceeds of production from oil and gas operations when life tenants and remaindermen are involved.

Specifically, Colorado just updated its statutes governing the process for the determination of heirship, found in the Colorado Probate Code at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-1301, et. seq.  A sub-committee of the Trust and Estate section of the Colorado Bar Association carefully reviewed the existing statutes, coordinated efforts with other sections of the bar, and with the approval of the Trust and Estate section, presented revisions to these statute sections as part of the omnibus bill, SB 16-133, in February 2016.  The committee’s goal was to address the issues Colorado practitioners have experienced in trying to distribute these interests from dormant or previously-unopened probate estates and to make the process to distribute previously undistributed property, including mineral interests, more clear.  SB 16-133 was signed by Governor Hickenlooper on May 4, 2016, thereby adopting the revisions recommended by the committee.  A copy of the Bill as enacted can be found here.

Read more

Basic Estate Principles Learned From the Death of Prince

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by Jody H. Hall, Paralegal

The entire world entered mourning when music legend Prince died unexpectedly on April 21, 2016 at the age of 57. There is certainly no shortage of stories and speculation in the news and social media regarding the circumstances surrounding his death, and the handling of his legal, personal and business affairs.

However, as trust and estates professionals, we are drawn to the estate planning, or lack thereof, of the cultural icon. The story that will undoubtedly change and evolve as the estate is administered can be an entertaining and valuable source of lessons learned to share with clients, family members, and dare I say, ourselves.

No one has been able to find a Will. The initial reports stated that no one was able to find a will, and no one had reason to believe that a Last Will and Testament had been created. This underscores not only the importance of having a Will, but also of making sure your nominated personal representative knows where to find it.  Most jurisdictions still require the original will to be lodged or filed with the Court, so your loved ones will need to be able to easily access the original signed document.  Copies are generally not acceptable without additional court action.  The best place to store those documents may also not be in a bank safe deposit box, unless that person has access to the box already.  Otherwise, it may require Court intervention to access the box to determine if a Will is inside.  Communication before your death with those that you trust to handle your affairs after your death will alleviate much stress and confusion.  Read more

Colorado Supreme Court Upholds the Strict Privity Doctrine for Attorney Malpractice Claims

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by Kelly Dickson Cooper

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the strict privity doctrine for attorney malpractice claims by nonclients and reaffirmed that an attorney’s liability is limited to when the attorney has committed fraud or a malicious or tortious act, including negligent misrepresentation. Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, case number 2013SC551 (2016 CO 5).

In Baker, the dissatisfied beneficiaries sued the attorneys for their father and alleged as follows:

  • The attorneys failed to advise their father of the impact of holding property in joint tenancy.
  • The attorneys failed to advise their father that failing to sever those joint tenancies would frustrate his intent to treat his children equally with his stepchildren.
  • The attorneys’ actions allowed the surviving spouse to change their father’s estate plan after his death.
  • The attorneys drafted documents for the surviving spouse that were different from their father’s original plan.
  • The beneficiaries were the intended beneficiaries of the client’s plan, that the attorneys failed to advise the beneficiaries of the relevant facts, and that they had suffered damages as a result.

The beneficiaries asked the Colorado Supreme Court to adopt the “California Test” or the “Florida-Iowa Rule” and set aside the strict privity rule. The Court rejected the adoption of both tests and reaffirmed the strict privity rule. The Court also held that the beneficiaries’ claims would fail under both the California Test and the Florida-Iowa Rule.

The Court put forth the following rationales for upholding the strict privity rule in Colorado:

  • It protects the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client and allows for effective advocacy for the client.
  • Abandoning strict privity could result in adversarial relationships between an attorney and third parties. This could result in conflicting duties for the attorney.
  • Without strict privity, the attorney could be liable to an unforeseeable and unlimited number of people.
  • Expanding attorney liability to nonclients might deter attorneys from taking on certain legal matters. The Court reasoned that this result could compromise the interests of potential clients by making it more difficult to obtain legal services.
  • Casting aside strict privity would increase the risk of suits by disappointed beneficiaries. Those suits would cast doubt on the testator’s intentions after his or her death when he or she is unavailable to speak.
  • The beneficiaries have other avenues available to them, including reformation of the documents.
  • A personal representative can pursue legitimate claims on behalf of a testator.

The Court held, “We further believe that the strict privity rule strikes the appropriate balance between the important interests of clients, on the one hand, and non-clients claiming to be injured by an attorney’s conduct, on the other.” As a result, the strict privity rule remains intact in Colorado.

Now There Are Tax Transcripts In Lieu of Estate Tax Closing Letters

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by Carol Warnick

The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) announced earlier this year that it would no longer routinely send out an estate tax closing letter and that such letters would have to be specifically requested by the taxpayer. The change in procedure was effective for all estate tax returns filed after June 1, 2015.

Previously, an estate tax closing letter was evidence to show that the IRS had either accepted an estate tax return as filed, or if there has been an audit, that final changes had been made and accepted. Receipt of an estate tax closing letter has never meant that the statute of limitations on the return has run, but it has given comfort to the estate administrator that he or she could make distributions and/or pay creditors knowing that the chances of further IRS review of the return was not likely. Many personal representatives and trustees have made it a practice to wait for such a closing letter before funding sub-trusts or making any significant distributions.

On December 4, 2015, the IRS announced that “account transcripts, which reflect transactions including the acceptance of Form 706 and the completion of an examination, may be an acceptable substitute for the estate tax closing letter.”   Such account transcripts will be made available online to registered tax professionals using the Transcript Delivery System (TDS). Transcripts will also be made available to authorized representatives making requests using Form 4506-T. They still must be requested, but may be easier to obtain than an estate tax closing letter.

For further instructions, here is the link to the information on the IRS website: http://tinyurl.com/plhb6f6.

Updates for fiduciaries from the IRS and Colorado

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by Kelly Cooper

The IRS has stated that it will not issue closing letters for federal estate tax returns filed on or after June 1, 2015, unless one is requested by the taxpayer. The information provided by the IRS states that the taxpayer should wait at least four months after filing the return to request a closing letter. A closing letter indicates that the estate’s federal estate tax liabilities have been paid. While a closing letter is not a formal closing agreement, many fiduciaries wish to have a closing letter from the IRS before making final distributions and closing estates. For returns filed prior to June 1, 2015, please refer to the following document for guidance as to when a closing letter will be issued:

Frequently Asked Questions on Estate Taxes

Certain statutes in the Colorado Probate Code are subject to cost of living adjustments each year. The numbers for 2010-2015 can viewed here:

Cost of Living Adjustment of Certain Dollar Amounts for Property of Estates in Probate

What Does It Mean To Be A Trustee?

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by Carol Warnick

We are constantly surprised to realize that the normal, average trustee who is not a professional fiduciary doesn’t really understand what is required of him or her and often makes serious mistakes.  You would expect that someone taking over the role of being a trustee would inquire or do some type of research as to what is expected, but unfortunately many new trustees don’t seem to take the responsibility seriously enough, often with disastrous consequences.

The trustee stands in a special relationship with the grantor of the trust as well as to the beneficiaries.  This relationship is unique and the trustee should keep that in the forefront of his or her mind.  By appointing someone as trustee, the grantor is depending upon the trustee to both honor the provisions of the trust to the best of his or her ability, but also to respond to the needs  of the beneficiaries and to maintain their confidence and trust.  The trustee must be careful not to do anything which would benefit the trustee to the detriment of the beneficiaries or to ignore the duties and obligations of a trustee.  Thus the word “trust” inside the term “trustee” should not be taken lightly. 

The obligations of a trustee are defined not only by the trust agreement, but also by state law, some of which is statutory and some of which is common law.  State laws may differ from state to state, but some basic premises hold true wherever  a trust is being administered.  In general, these duties of a trustee are important and can result in litigation, removal, and potentially surcharge if the trustee ignores them.  

Some of the general duties of a trustee are set forth below, as taken from “What It Means to Be A Trustee:  A Guide for Clients,” published in the ACTEC Journal, Volume 31, No. 1, Summer 2005. 

  • Duty to Administer Trust by Its Terms.  The trust, including amendments,  provides a roadmap for the trustee and unless its terms are ambiguous, the trustee must follow its terms.  As mentioned above, state law will govern many areas where the trust is silent, so the trustee must be versed in the state law where the jurisdiction is administered. 
  • Duty of Skill and Care.  Skill, prudence and diligence — this is a high standard of performance — higher that one would be expected to follow if administering one’s own assets. 
  • Duty to Give Notice.  The trustee must be familiar with the language of the trust as well as state law to determine when he or she must give notice to beneficiaries, or perhaps a co-trustee.  Some examples requiring notice to certain individuals are resignation, delegation or designation of a successor trustee, rights of beneficiaries to withdraw principal at certain times, the naming of a professional investment advisor, of delegation of the investment function.
  • Duty to Furnish Information and to Communicate.  The trustee must keep the beneficiaries informed about the administration of the trust.  This may include information about investment performance, actions of the trustee or anything else reasonably requested by the beneficiary. 
  • Duty to Account.  The laws of most states require that the beneficiaries be given regular accountings reflecting the liabilities, receipts and disbursements of the trust.  The form and frequency varies from state to state or the language of the trust document. 
  • Duty Not to Delegate.  Generally, the trustee has the duty not to delegate acts requiring judgment and discretion (typically the trustee was chosen because he or she exhibited good judgment and sound exercise of discretion) unless specifically given that authority in the trust document or by statute.  The trustee may hire agents such as attorneys, accountants, investment advisors, etc. but the trustee should not blindly follow their advice.  The exception to that would be a Directed Trust, which is beyond the scope of this article
  • Duty of Loyalty.  The trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.
  • Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest.  The trustee should not use trust property for personal gain and should not use the trust assets in a manner that benefits the trustee personally.  The exception to this is when self-dealing provisions are written into the trust for the benefit of trustees who are also beneficiaries of the trust.  Even if such provisions are present, a trustee needs to be especially careful of self-dealing transactions and should consider appointing an independent trustee (if the trust or state law allows it) strictly for the purpose of authorizing such transactions. 
  • Duty to Segregate Trust Property.  The trustee must not co-mingle personal funds or any other non-trust funds with the assets of the trust.
  • Duty of Impartiality.  The trustee must treat all the beneficiaries impartially unless the trust itself instructs otherwise.  This becomes complicated when the trustee must balance the interests of the income beneficiaries with the interests of the remainder beneficiaries of a trust. 
  • Duty to Invest.  The trustee has a duty to invest the assets appropriately.  Unless otherwise specified, that includes a duty to diversify assets.
  • Duty to Enforce and Defend Claims.  The trustee must take reasonable steps to defend claims against the trust and to enforce claims the trust may have against others.  Part of the decision-making process in determining what is reasonable needs to be an assessment of the costs  of enforcing or defending versus the costs to the trust of not taking action on the claim.
  • Duty of Confidentiality.  The affairs of the trust should be kept confidential except with those who are by law “interested persons” such as the beneficiaries and co-trustees. The trustee should not disclose to third parties the identify or interests of the beneficiaries or the nature of trust assets, unless requested to do so by a beneficiary who may need certain information disclosed to a third party.  This duty of confidentiality also extends to personal things about beneficiaries that may come to the knowledge of the trustee in the process of administering the trust.

Any trustee paying close attention to the duties listed above will stand a much better chance of making the trustee experience a positive one and will be much more likely to avoid problems or lawsuits from beneficiaries. 

Who Gets the Embryo?

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by Elizabeth Meck

This has been a busy week in celebrity news, particularly with regard to advancements in assisted reproductive technology and the applicability of legally enforceable agreements.

For example, Sophia Vergara, superstar of ABC sitcom Modern Family, is now embroiled in a legal battle with her ex-fiancé, Nick Loeb, regarding two frozen embryos created by the then-couple several years ago when they were planning to use in vitro fertilization and a gestational surrogate to have a baby. Vergara and Loeb executed documents at their fertility clinic stating their agreement to keep the embryos frozen unless both parties mutually agreed to use them (i.e., to implant them into a surrogate) or to destroy them. Otherwise, the parties agreed that the embryos would only be destroyed if one of them dies. Apparently, the standard documents did not address what would happen to the embryos in the event the couple did not remain together or could not agree whether to use or destroy the embryos. Hence, Loeb filed a lawsuit in which he requests that a judge order that the embryos cannot be destroyed under any circumstances and states his position that the survivor between Loeb and Vergara would have control over the embryos upon the death of the other party. For more on the dispute, click here.

This type of dispute is not limited to the rich and famous. Assisted reproductive technology, or “ART,” is on the rise.1 The Centers for Disease Control estimates that approximately 12% of couples experience problems with fertility and as many as 12% of U.S. women and their partners receive infertility services.2 In 2009, the Colorado Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code III into the Colorado Probate Code (the “Code”), which incorporated several important changes regarding ART.3 For example, the Code now specifically includes definitions of a “genetic father” and a “genetic mother,” § 15-11-115(5-6), the definition of a “genetic parent," § 15-11-115(7), and clarification as to the individual who “functions as a parent of the child,” § 15-11-115(4), to assist in the determination of exactly who constitutes a child’s “parent” for purposes of succession under the Code.

Further, sections 15-11-116 to -121 of the Code re-codified the existing concept that marital status is not necessarily determinative of a parent-child relationship. As a result, the rules of who is eligible to “take” in an intestacy proceeding have been expanded to include ART children who are adopted or in the process of being adopted. § 15-11-119(5). An ART child does not, however, maintain intestacy rights as to a gestational carrier, absent additional evidence of the parent-child relationship. § 15-11-121(3). Importantly, though, an ART child who is born to a birth mother, who is not a gestational mother, is considered the child of the birth mother regardless of whether the child is genetically tied to the birth mother; and, the person who consented to the assisted reproduction by the birth mother with the “intent” to be treated as the other parent of the child is the parent. § 15-11-120. Intent can be demonstrated any number of ways pursuant to § 15-11-120(6).4 It is important to note that a parent can demonstrate “intent” to be treated as the parent of a posthumously conceived child, so long as the child is in utero within thirty-six months or born within forty-five months of the intended parent’s death. § 15-11-120(11).

ART children may also be included in the definition of a class defined in estate planning documents such as “children” or “grandchildren” or “descendants,” even though they may or may not be genetically related to the grantor or settlor. For example, an ART child may be included in the class even though he or she is not in utero for thirty-six months or born up to forty-five months after the grantor’s or the settlor’s death. § 15-11-705(7).

The presence of ART and the constantly-evolving technologies in this area require that estate planning attorneys, drafters of marital agreements and probate litigators be vigilantly aware of the repercussions of these definitions and our changing laws, as well as how the changing definition of “family” will play out after a decedent’s death. It is increasingly important to ask estate planning clients whether they have any children who were the result of ART, or whether they still have any cryopreserved sperm, eggs, or embryos. Also, including specific instructions with regard to ART in the estate planning documents may become necessary so as to try to avoid dispute after the passing of a genetic parent, an adoptive parent, or an individual who consented to ART by a birth mother.

Additionally, it is increasingly important to inquire as to the existence of any existing written document or directive that specifies the ultimate use or destruction of frozen genetic material such as embryos. Sophia Vergara’s experience could teach us all a good lesson in terms of covering all aspects of “family” as well as “property” when discussing issues with clients whether in the planning stages or during the administration of an estate or trust. For example, practitioners should start to think about the importance of including genetic material in estate planning documents and marital agreements. Further, practitioners should discuss post-death use and disposition of genetic materials with their clients, and address questions such as whether the surviving spouse should be able to utilize a frozen embryo after the death of the other spouse.

At the end of the day, it is crucial to ensure that a client’s documents consistently reflect his or her wishes regarding all assets, family and dispositions, including the often-difficult decision of how to treat and manage genetic materials. Clarification in the planning documents and marital agreements may reduce the potential for surprises and disputes during estate and trust administration or divorce. Otherwise, as in many other areas of probate litigation, disputes with regard to one’s entitlement to an estate or trust will continue to rise.

1ART commonly includes a variety of assisted reproduction methods such as: sperm or egg donation, in vitro fertilization, gestational surrogacy, embryo donation or adoption, embryo or egg or sperm cryopreservation, post-death conception, and the disposition of cryopreserved embryos.
2Centers for Disease Control, 2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth.
3The Code defines ART as “a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.” § 15-11-115(2).
4Intent can be demonstrated by the following: a signed record that evidences the individual’s consent; evidence that the individual functioned as the parent of the child no more than two years after the child is born; or, the intent to function as the parent of the child within two years of the child’s birth notwithstanding that the individual’s intent was thwarted by incapacity or death. § 15-11-120(6).

Trustees Take Heed: Arizona Adopts the Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege

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by Kelly Cooper

For trustees in Colorado, the question remains to what extent does the attorney-client privilege offer protection from disclosure of confidential communications between trustees and their attorneys in litigation with beneficiaries.  Despite the uncertainty in Colorado, several states and the U.S. Supreme Court have weighed in on this question and Arizona is the latest state to adopt the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.  Hammerman v. The Northern Trust Company, 329 P.3d 1055 (Ariz. App. June 3, 2014).

The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a trustee’s attorney-client privilege “extends to all legal advice sought in the trustee’s personal capacity for purposes of self-protection.”  However, the Court also held that the trustee had an “obligation to disclose to Hammerman [beneficiary]  all attorney-client communications that occurred in its fiduciary capacity on matters of administration of the trust.”

These standards will inevitably give rise to many questions depending on the facts and circumstances of the trust administration at issue, but one will likely come up over and over again.  At what point will a trustee be permitted to seek advice for self-protection.  Is a question from a beneficiary enough?  Does a lawsuit have to be filed?  A demand letter sent?  Can the trustee use trust funds to pay for the advice?

In a departure from other courts, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the trustee’s attorney-client privilege does not end merely because the advice was paid for out of trust funds.  (For example, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the source of payment for fees is “highly relevant” in identifying who is the “real client.”  United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011).  The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the source of payment was a ““significant factor… [and] a strong indication of precisely who the real clients were.”  Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 1976).)

Without any clear guidance in Colorado, it is important for trustees (and their counsel) to keep a close watch on future developments.