No Medical Evidence Required for Appointment of a Conservator

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by Kelly Dickson Cooper

Imagine that you have just discovered that your father has received several unsolicited emails asking for money and that he has sent almost $500,000 to anonymous offshore bank accounts.  Worried for your father, you decide to seek a conservatorship to protect his assets. 

These are the facts that started the dispute resulting in a recent Colorado Court of Appeals case, In re Neher, 2015 COA 103 (July 30, 2015).

At the hearing, there was no medical evidence presented, but rather, expert testimony from a CPA.  The Court ruled in favor of son and his father appealed.  The father’s primary argument on appeal was that Colorado’s conservatorship statute requires medical evidence before a court can determine whether a conservator is necessary. 

Colorado’s conservatorship statute provides that a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is unable to manage his property and business affairs because they cannot effectively receive and evaluate related information.  In addition, a petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the individual has assets that will be wasted or dissipated unless management is provided and that protection is necessary.

The Court of Appeals denied the father’s appeal and held that medical evidence is not required evidence in a proceeding requesting appointment of a conservator.  The Court of Appeals considered the following in reaching the decision:

-The language of the statute does not expressly require expert testimony like other statutes in Colorado.

-The language of the statute does not require that a petitioner show the causes of the individual’s inability to effectively receive or evaluate information.

-The Court’s interpretation is consistent with other conservatorship statutes.

-To determine legislative intent, the Court compared the Colorado statute to the Uniform Probate Code and specifically identified that the Colorado statute did not contain the language “an impairment” like the Uniform Probate Code.

The Court of Appeals rejected the father’s arguments that the judicial department forms regarding the appointment of a conservator and the termination of a conservatorship contain references to a physician’s letter or professional evaluation.  The Court of Appeals also rejected the father’s out of state case citations as unpersuasive.

Litigation in the area of conservatorships is continuing to grow and this case provides important guidance for the interpretation of the Colorado standard for the appointment of a conservator.

Who Gets the Embryo?

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by Elizabeth Meck

This has been a busy week in celebrity news, particularly with regard to advancements in assisted reproductive technology and the applicability of legally enforceable agreements.

For example, Sophia Vergara, superstar of ABC sitcom Modern Family, is now embroiled in a legal battle with her ex-fiancé, Nick Loeb, regarding two frozen embryos created by the then-couple several years ago when they were planning to use in vitro fertilization and a gestational surrogate to have a baby. Vergara and Loeb executed documents at their fertility clinic stating their agreement to keep the embryos frozen unless both parties mutually agreed to use them (i.e., to implant them into a surrogate) or to destroy them. Otherwise, the parties agreed that the embryos would only be destroyed if one of them dies. Apparently, the standard documents did not address what would happen to the embryos in the event the couple did not remain together or could not agree whether to use or destroy the embryos. Hence, Loeb filed a lawsuit in which he requests that a judge order that the embryos cannot be destroyed under any circumstances and states his position that the survivor between Loeb and Vergara would have control over the embryos upon the death of the other party. For more on the dispute, click here.

This type of dispute is not limited to the rich and famous. Assisted reproductive technology, or “ART,” is on the rise.1 The Centers for Disease Control estimates that approximately 12% of couples experience problems with fertility and as many as 12% of U.S. women and their partners receive infertility services.2 In 2009, the Colorado Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code III into the Colorado Probate Code (the “Code”), which incorporated several important changes regarding ART.3 For example, the Code now specifically includes definitions of a “genetic father” and a “genetic mother,” § 15-11-115(5-6), the definition of a “genetic parent," § 15-11-115(7), and clarification as to the individual who “functions as a parent of the child,” § 15-11-115(4), to assist in the determination of exactly who constitutes a child’s “parent” for purposes of succession under the Code.

Further, sections 15-11-116 to -121 of the Code re-codified the existing concept that marital status is not necessarily determinative of a parent-child relationship. As a result, the rules of who is eligible to “take” in an intestacy proceeding have been expanded to include ART children who are adopted or in the process of being adopted. § 15-11-119(5). An ART child does not, however, maintain intestacy rights as to a gestational carrier, absent additional evidence of the parent-child relationship. § 15-11-121(3). Importantly, though, an ART child who is born to a birth mother, who is not a gestational mother, is considered the child of the birth mother regardless of whether the child is genetically tied to the birth mother; and, the person who consented to the assisted reproduction by the birth mother with the “intent” to be treated as the other parent of the child is the parent. § 15-11-120. Intent can be demonstrated any number of ways pursuant to § 15-11-120(6).4 It is important to note that a parent can demonstrate “intent” to be treated as the parent of a posthumously conceived child, so long as the child is in utero within thirty-six months or born within forty-five months of the intended parent’s death. § 15-11-120(11).

ART children may also be included in the definition of a class defined in estate planning documents such as “children” or “grandchildren” or “descendants,” even though they may or may not be genetically related to the grantor or settlor. For example, an ART child may be included in the class even though he or she is not in utero for thirty-six months or born up to forty-five months after the grantor’s or the settlor’s death. § 15-11-705(7).

The presence of ART and the constantly-evolving technologies in this area require that estate planning attorneys, drafters of marital agreements and probate litigators be vigilantly aware of the repercussions of these definitions and our changing laws, as well as how the changing definition of “family” will play out after a decedent’s death. It is increasingly important to ask estate planning clients whether they have any children who were the result of ART, or whether they still have any cryopreserved sperm, eggs, or embryos. Also, including specific instructions with regard to ART in the estate planning documents may become necessary so as to try to avoid dispute after the passing of a genetic parent, an adoptive parent, or an individual who consented to ART by a birth mother.

Additionally, it is increasingly important to inquire as to the existence of any existing written document or directive that specifies the ultimate use or destruction of frozen genetic material such as embryos. Sophia Vergara’s experience could teach us all a good lesson in terms of covering all aspects of “family” as well as “property” when discussing issues with clients whether in the planning stages or during the administration of an estate or trust. For example, practitioners should start to think about the importance of including genetic material in estate planning documents and marital agreements. Further, practitioners should discuss post-death use and disposition of genetic materials with their clients, and address questions such as whether the surviving spouse should be able to utilize a frozen embryo after the death of the other spouse.

At the end of the day, it is crucial to ensure that a client’s documents consistently reflect his or her wishes regarding all assets, family and dispositions, including the often-difficult decision of how to treat and manage genetic materials. Clarification in the planning documents and marital agreements may reduce the potential for surprises and disputes during estate and trust administration or divorce. Otherwise, as in many other areas of probate litigation, disputes with regard to one’s entitlement to an estate or trust will continue to rise.

1ART commonly includes a variety of assisted reproduction methods such as: sperm or egg donation, in vitro fertilization, gestational surrogacy, embryo donation or adoption, embryo or egg or sperm cryopreservation, post-death conception, and the disposition of cryopreserved embryos.
2Centers for Disease Control, 2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth.
3The Code defines ART as “a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.” § 15-11-115(2).
4Intent can be demonstrated by the following: a signed record that evidences the individual’s consent; evidence that the individual functioned as the parent of the child no more than two years after the child is born; or, the intent to function as the parent of the child within two years of the child’s birth notwithstanding that the individual’s intent was thwarted by incapacity or death. § 15-11-120(6).

Trustees Take Heed: Arizona Adopts the Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege

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by Kelly Cooper

For trustees in Colorado, the question remains to what extent does the attorney-client privilege offer protection from disclosure of confidential communications between trustees and their attorneys in litigation with beneficiaries.  Despite the uncertainty in Colorado, several states and the U.S. Supreme Court have weighed in on this question and Arizona is the latest state to adopt the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.  Hammerman v. The Northern Trust Company, 329 P.3d 1055 (Ariz. App. June 3, 2014).

The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a trustee’s attorney-client privilege “extends to all legal advice sought in the trustee’s personal capacity for purposes of self-protection.”  However, the Court also held that the trustee had an “obligation to disclose to Hammerman [beneficiary]  all attorney-client communications that occurred in its fiduciary capacity on matters of administration of the trust.”

These standards will inevitably give rise to many questions depending on the facts and circumstances of the trust administration at issue, but one will likely come up over and over again.  At what point will a trustee be permitted to seek advice for self-protection.  Is a question from a beneficiary enough?  Does a lawsuit have to be filed?  A demand letter sent?  Can the trustee use trust funds to pay for the advice?

In a departure from other courts, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the trustee’s attorney-client privilege does not end merely because the advice was paid for out of trust funds.  (For example, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the source of payment for fees is “highly relevant” in identifying who is the “real client.”  United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011).  The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the source of payment was a ““significant factor… [and] a strong indication of precisely who the real clients were.”  Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 1976).)

Without any clear guidance in Colorado, it is important for trustees (and their counsel) to keep a close watch on future developments. 

Avoidable Litigation as a Threat to the Assets of An Estate

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by Carol Warnick

It wasn’t that long ago when the real threat to the financial well-being of a person’s estate was death taxes.  People were concerned about losing close to 50% of their estate to taxes without proper planning.  But with the increased exemption amounts, death taxes are not a big issue in most cases.  But something else is taking its toll on the hope of a smooth and simple passing of assets at death, and that is litigation. 

Much of the current estate litigation relates to family disputes, some of which might have been avoided through better estate planning.  But a certain amount of these family disputes would have occurred anyway simply because the families were upset enough to litigate over anything once mom and dad have passed away.  There is a different type of litigation beginning to crop up, however, that may create just as many problems for an estate as family in-fighting, and one which can be totally prevented.  I am speaking of litigation over wills and trusts drafted with forms obtained over the internet.

Unfortunately, with the increased exemption amounts (currently $5.43 million per person) and since many people no longer need tax planning they are more apt to decide they can do their estate planning documents themselves and not involve an attorney.  While self-drafted wills are not new and have been creating estate administration problems for years, I believe that the current ease of finding forms on the internet, making a few changes, and printing them at home will likely make this a more significant problem in the future. 

Cases are starting to crop up regarding mistakes made by consumers using internet forms.  One Florida case is a good example.  The case is Aldrich v. Basile, 136 So. 3rd, 530 (Fla. 2014).  In this case, Ms. Aldrich used a form and listed all the assets she owned at the time (her home and its contents, an IRA, a car and some bank accounts) and stated they should go to her sister.  If her sister didn’t survive her, she listed her brother as the one to receive everything. 

As luck would have it, her sister predeceased her and left her some additional assets which weren’t listed in Ms. Aldrich’s will because she didn’t own them when she drafted her will.   Either because the internet form didn’t contain one or because Ms. Aldrich took it out when she printed the will because she thought all her assets were covered, there was no residuary clause in the will.  As a result, after a trial court decision, an appellate court reversal, and ultimately an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, it was decided that the listed assets would go per the will but the after-acquired assets inherited from her sister would pass through intestacy, bringing in two nieces who were the daughters of Ms. Aldrich’s deceased brother to share in the estate.

Although the living brother offered a note left by Ms. Aldrich and other extrinsic evidence that Ms. Aldrich intended all of her assets to go to him, the court refused to consider them because of the “four corners” doctrine. There was no ambiguity within the four corners of the will, therefore no extrinsic evidence was admitted.

It is easy to see how Ms. Aldrich could have simply deleted the residuary clause thinking she didn’t need it, but it is very unlikely that a competent lawyer drafting a will would make that mistake.  If the lawyer had made the mistake, there would potentially have been recourse through the lawyer’s malpractice insurance. It seems that the ease of which will and trust forms are now available on the internet and the fact that many people don’t need a lawyer’s expertise for tax planning under current law will combine to create many more of these problems.  Such problems lead to costly litigation with really no recourse for the families of those “do-it-yourselfers.”

Several states have looked at the issue of whether or not legal form providers are violating unauthorized practice of law statutes, but the cases are by no means consistently decided.  While such issues are being sorted out, the old adage “buyer beware” certainly applies with regard to do-it-yourself wills and trusts. 

A concurring opinion in the Florida case summed it up as follows:

Obviously, the cost of drafting a will through the use of a pre-printed form is likely substantially lower than the cost of hiring a knowledgeable lawyer.  However, as illustrated by this case, the ultimate cost of utilizing such a form to draft one’s will has the potential to far surpass the cost of hiring a lawyer at the outset.  In a case such as this, which involved a substantial sum of money, the time, effort, and expense of extensive litigation undertaken in order to prove a testator’s true intent after the testator’s death can necessitate the expenditure of much more substantial amounts in attorney’s fees than was avoided during the testator’s life by the use of a pre-printed form1.

 1Aldrich v. Basile, 136 So. 3rd 530, 538 (Fla. 2014). 

New Year Resolution: More Transparency About Estate Plans

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by Elizabeth Meck

The holidays are a time when families come together to celebrate and to share in the warmth of the season.  It is a time to spend with multiple generations and to toast to another year of health and happiness.  While the holidays may not feel like the perfect time to bring up heavy topics such as planning for disability or death, this is the perfect time to do so because of the multiple generations of family members gathered together.

As fiduciary litigators, we are frequently asked about the trends we see or what types of issues drive probate disputes among family members.  While our answers to these types of questions do frequently include complex tax calculations or the interpretation of an ambiguous trust or will provision, we can consistently attribute a significant portion of disputes to a general lack of communication.

This lack of communication does occur in the form of beneficiaries who feel that a trustee is not providing adequate information or accountings (more on that later).  However, it also occurs when family members feel left in the dark regarding their loved one’s intentions in making certain estate planning decisions.  Expanding the conversation about estate planning from spouses to siblings and younger generations early on in the process, therefore, may help to alleviate some of the confusion that frequently leads to disputes once a testator or settlor is gone. 

Maintaining good communication will become increasingly important as we embark on an unprecedented transfer of wealth  in the coming decades.  As baby boomers prepare to transfer their own accumulated assets, they may be seeing significant inheritances themselves.  The result, according to experts, is that anywhere from $27 to $40 trillion will change hands between now and 2050. 

This is not a problem reserved solely for the wealthy, however.  Discussing the succession plan for a small family business or a modest vacation home can help to avoid strain, confusion and tension among surviving family members.  Furthermore, an issue that regularly arises in probate litigation is the division of personal property.  Because items of personal property carry significant sentimental value, they can become the center of intense and protracted litigation.  Conversations about these sentimental items ahead of time can greatly reduce the chances of disputes surrounding the ultimate distribution of such items later on.

Finally, the more a family member knows about an individual’s estate planning intentions, the more astute the family member will be to spot and respond to potential undue influence by a third party or risky changes in the testator’s or settlor’s capacity should these issues arise in the future.

So raise a glass this New Year’s to another year of health and happiness, and then gently let your family members know that you also want to chat about their estate plan and yours.  You can let them know that it is for their own good.

… And just in case you are the trustee of a trust, it is equally important that you are providing sufficient information to any beneficiaries.  The New Year can be a good time to conduct a simple annual assessment of the trust and to provide any necessary updates or reports to beneficiaries. 

Using a Private Judge in Trust and Estate Litigation

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by C. Jean Stewart

In 1981 the Colorado Legislature approved a measure allowing parties to litigation to hire a former judge to serve on their case instead of the judge assigned by the district.  C.R.S. §13-3-111 and Rule 122, CRCP.  In some states, California, for example, this system is called “private judging.”  In Colorado, it is simply called “appointed judges.”  Under the new ICCES filing system the title is “judge pro tem.” 

After the appointment, all of the costs of the case, including the “appointed judge’s fees and costs,” must be paid by the parties “at no cost to the state.”  The appointed judge, or the parties, may later return the case to the original judge and the appointment terminates.

Cases with appointed judges are not procedurally different than routine court cases in Colorado; they are neither more nor less private.  Pleadings are filed in the normal course and records are maintained as part of the routine court files; the Rules of Civil or Probate Procedure apply as appropriate and decisions are appealable.  However, each case will constitute a single or small caseload for the appointed judge and consequently will receive heightened attention and speedier resolution.

All parties in the case must agree on the selection of an appointed judge.  The parties may request that their case be heard by a jury and the case may even be heard in the same courthouse where originally filed, if space and time are available, although cases can also be heard in rented space or in conference rooms made available at no cost by one of the parties’ attorneys.

To have a private judge appointed, the parties must submit a motion to the Colorado Supreme Court that includes all of the statutory requirements, complies with C.R.C.P., Rule 122, sets forth the parties’ request for and agreement to the appointment, and includes the proposed judge’s signed approval of the motion. The actual appointment is accomplished on an Order Appointing Judge that must be signed by the Chief Justice. The estimated fees and costs of using any appointed judge must be referenced in the Motion for Appointed Judge and deposited in advance of the appointment into an “escrow” account.

Counsel for the parties should plan a joint conference call with the proposed appointed judge to discuss the nature of the appointment, the anticipated time commitment, and any special circumstances as early as possible after it is anticipated that an appointment may be sought. Because of the nature of any case involving an appointed judge, all contacts should include notice to all parties and counsel in the case. There should be no actual or attempted ex parte communication.

The Fall of Colorado’s Same Sex Marriage Ban

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By Kelly Cooper

Starting on Monday, marriage licenses were issued in Colorado to couples regardless of sexual orientation.

This change came because the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear cases from Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.  What do these five states have in common?  Each of them had banned same sex marriage and had those bans declared unconstitutional by a U.S. Court of Appeals. 

In refusing to hear these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld three U.S. Courts of Appeal’s decisions declaring the same sex marriage bans unconstitutional and making same sex marriages legal in Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. 

The impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear these cases has reached far beyond the borders of those five states.  This is because every state in the U.S. is subject to the decisions made by one U.S. Court of Appeals.  For example, Colorado is situated in the 10th Circuit and the 10th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals declared Utah’s ban on same sex marriage unconstitutional.  Since Utah and Colorado are both bound by 10th Circuit’s decisions, it is likely that Colorado’s same sex marriage ban would also be declared unconstitutional by the 10th Circuit.  As a result, various county clerks began issuing marriage licenses to same sex couples in Colorado.

Current status: There are 19 states that permit same sex marriages plus the District of Columbia.  Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision not to hear these cases, five more states’ bans on same sex marriage will fall bringing the total number of states permitting same sex marriage to 24.  Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, an additional six states’ same sex marriage bans are effectively overruled, including Colorado’s.  The other five states are Wyoming, Kansas, North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia.  This will bring the total number of states allowing same sex marriage to 30.

 We can expect more developments and changes in this area in the near term, so stay tuned.

Your Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty

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by Elizabeth Meck

The Fiduciary Law Blog recently posted an article in which we observed that “fiduciary” is a vague term encompassing many different people and several different relationships. Under Colorado law, a fiduciary includes, without limitation, a trustee of any trust, a personal representative, guardian, conservator, receiver, partner, agent, or “any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust, or estate.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-1-103(2).

Any fiduciary must abide by the duties and obligations generally known as “fiduciary duties,” which are among the highest duties under the law. This post is the first in a short series in which we will discuss the fiduciary duties applied to trustees, when it may be appropriate for a trustee to delegate certain duties, and a trustee’s potential liability for breaching these important duties.

In the context of a trust, and as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2, a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arises out of the manifestation of an intention to create the fiduciary relationship and subjects the trustee “to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person.”

The trustee’s most basic function is to hold title to and manage trust property pursuant to the terms of the trust instrument, which he must do with the utmost loyalty, good faith and honesty. Generally, the fiduciary duties applicable to a trustee are: the duty of loyalty, the duty to exercise care and skill in managing the trust assets and administering the trust, and the duty to remain impartial to all beneficiaries. This post will focus on the duty of loyalty.

The duty of loyalty, perhaps the broadest of the fiduciary duties, has been described as “inherent” in the trust relationship. George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543 (2d rev. ed. 1980). This duty requires the trustee to remain loyal to the beneficiaries of the trust in all aspects of trust administration. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170.1 Fundamental to the duty of loyalty is the obligation to adhere to the terms of the trust instrument itself and to undertake all actions in accordance with applicable law. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 169.

As defined in Scott on Trusts, the trustee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty is the “duty of a trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.” Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 170 (4th ed. 1987) (emphasis added). A trustee, therefore, “is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries.” Id. Under the duty of loyalty, the trustee must refrain from engaging in any act of self-dealing or conflicts of interests that may result in increased benefit to himself. Such transactions would constitute a breach of the trustee’s duty of loyalty, may expose the trustee to personal liability, and may be voided by the beneficiaries. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b.

Further, the duty of loyalty requires the trustee to “communicate to [all beneficiaries] all material facts” in connection with the administration of the trust. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170. Failure to inform beneficiaries of important decisions or material facts may not only constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, but frequently creates feelings of distrust toward the trustee. It is important, therefore, for the trustee to remain transparent, which we discussed in a prior blog post.

The duty of loyalty applies to the administration of a non-charitable trust as well as charitable trusts. This is the case even though a charitable trust may exist perpetually. A trustee of a charitable trust must administer the trust solely in the interests of effectuating the trust’s charitable purposes. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 379 cm. a.

As stated above, the duty of loyalty is broad and requires the trustee to regularly ensure that he is acting solely in the best interest of the beneficiaries. It is wise for any trustee to step back occasionally to make sure that his actions as trustee are taken in accordance with the duty of loyalty.

In the next blog entry in this series, we will discuss the duty of the trustee to exercise care and skill in the management of trust assets and administration of the trust.

1For further discussion on the duty of loyalty, see Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts §§ 169-186 (4th ed. 1987); and George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543-543(V) (rev. 2d rev. ed. replacement vol. 1993).

Should an undue influencer be responsible for paying the legal fees incurred to rectify the undue influence?

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by Kelly Cooper

In a recent unpublished decision, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a niece who unduly influenced her uncle was not responsible for the payment of the uncle's legal fees, which were required to rectify the undue influence and return the property to the uncle.

Specifically, the niece was accused of unduly influencing her uncle to give her pieces of real estate during his life. A jury found that the niece did unduly influence her uncle and that she breached her fiduciary duty to her uncle. As a result, the court ordered that the real estate be transferred back to the uncle. In addition, the jury awarded $315,000 in legal fees against the niece to make the uncle whole.

On appeal, the niece argued that she should not be responsible for the payment of attorney's fees because Colorado follows the American rule that parties in a dispute must pay their own legal fees. The uncle, through his conservator, argued that an award of legal fees was appropriate in this case under the breach of fiduciary duty/trust exception to the American rule. This exception was first recognized by the Colorado Court of Appeals in 1982. See Heller v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, 657 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1982). The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the exception in 1989. See Buder v. Satore, 774 P.2d 1383 (Colo. 1989).

Despite the recognition of this exception, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the Colorado Supreme Court has cautioned it against liberally construing any of the exceptions to the American rule.

In finding that the exception did not apply to this case of undue influence, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the niece's breach of fiduciary duty did not closely resemble a breach of trust. In addition, the Court of Appeals found that the niece breached her duty as an individual, rather than any fiduciary duty to manage property, and that abusing personal influence is not similar to mismanaging property as a fiduciary.

The citation for the case is: In the Interest of Phillip Delluomo, Protected Person, 2012CA2513.

Tax Certainty for Civil Unions in Colorado

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by Kelly Cooper

Couples in a civil union that are permitted to file federal income tax returns jointly can now file their Colorado income tax returns jointly as well.

Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill into law last Thursday (February 27, 2014).  It requires couples in a civil union to file their Colorado taxes using the same filing status used on their federal tax return.  The intent of the legislation is to align Colorado with updated federal tax law that permits joint filing for married same sex couples.

The new law will apply to tax years beginning on January 1, 2013 and any other income tax years that are still open under Section 39-21-107 or 39-21-108, C.R.S.