Should an undue influencer be responsible for paying the legal fees incurred to rectify the undue influence?

by Kelly Cooper

In a recent unpublished decision, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a niece who unduly influenced her uncle was not responsible for the payment of the uncle's legal fees, which were required to rectify the undue influence and return the property to the uncle.

Specifically, the niece was accused of unduly influencing her uncle to give her pieces of real estate during his life. A jury found that the niece did unduly influence her uncle and that she breached her fiduciary duty to her uncle. As a result, the court ordered that the real estate be transferred back to the uncle. In addition, the jury awarded $315,000 in legal fees against the niece to make the uncle whole.

On appeal, the niece argued that she should not be responsible for the payment of attorney's fees because Colorado follows the American rule that parties in a dispute must pay their own legal fees. The uncle, through his conservator, argued that an award of legal fees was appropriate in this case under the breach of fiduciary duty/trust exception to the American rule. This exception was first recognized by the Colorado Court of Appeals in 1982. See Heller v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, 657 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1982). The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the exception in 1989. See Buder v. Satore, 774 P.2d 1383 (Colo. 1989).

Despite the recognition of this exception, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the Colorado Supreme Court has cautioned it against liberally construing any of the exceptions to the American rule.

In finding that the exception did not apply to this case of undue influence, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the niece's breach of fiduciary duty did not closely resemble a breach of trust. In addition, the Court of Appeals found that the niece breached her duty as an individual, rather than any fiduciary duty to manage property, and that abusing personal influence is not similar to mismanaging property as a fiduciary.

The citation for the case is: In the Interest of Phillip Delluomo, Protected Person, 2012CA2513.

Tax Certainty for Civil Unions in Colorado

by Kelly Cooper

Couples in a civil union that are permitted to file federal income tax returns jointly can now file their Colorado income tax returns jointly as well.

Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill into law last Thursday (February 27, 2014).  It requires couples in a civil union to file their Colorado taxes using the same filing status used on their federal tax return.  The intent of the legislation is to align Colorado with updated federal tax law that permits joint filing for married same sex couples.

The new law will apply to tax years beginning on January 1, 2013 and any other income tax years that are still open under Section 39-21-107 or 39-21-108, C.R.S.

Letters of Wishes: Helpful or Hurtful?

by Kelly Cooper and Desta Asfaw

Most of the trusts we see instruct the trustee to consider making distributions for “health, education, maintenance and support.”  While the typical HEMS standard provides certainty in regard to taxes, it does not provide the trustee with any insight into what types of distributions the settlor wanted the beneficiaries to receive from the trust.  In addition, many trusts give the trustee broad discretion in regard to distributions (through the use of the words, “sole” or “absolute”), which puts even more pressure on the trustee to figure out if the settlor would have agreed to make distributions.  Typically, a trustee has little to no guidance from the settlor about his or her desires for the beneficiaries or his or her purposes in creating the trust (other than tax deferral or avoidance).

One solution to this problem is for the settlor of the trust to send to the trustee a non-binding letter of wishes.  Letters of wishes include personal information about the settlor and the beneficiaries, their relationships, the beneficiaries’ abilities and limitations and the settlor’s specific concerns or desires regarding each beneficiary.  Letters of wishes give the trustee more insight into the state of mind of the settlor when exercising discretion, which is helpful when exercising discretion in regard to distributions.

While letters of wishes are generally recognized in the estate planning community, there is very little law regarding the effect of a letter of wishes on a trustee’s discretion, whether reliance on a letter of wishes provides any liability protection to a trustee or if a letter of wishes must be disclosed to the beneficiaries.  If a settlor provides opinions and concerns about the beneficiaries in a letter of wishes that may be hurtful to the beneficiaries, the trustee will then be faced with the difficult decision – do you provide a copy of the letter of wishes to the beneficiaries?  If a claim for breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty should arise, it may be that the trustee is left with no choice but to make the letter available to the beneficiaries.  In Colorado, there is no case law regarding letters of wishes so it is unknown if the letters of wishes must be disclosed to beneficiaries under C.R.S. § 15-16-303 or whether a trustee can rely on a letter of wishes when making a distribution decision.

Even with the uncertainty relating to the disclosure and use of letters of wishes, any peek into the settlor’s mind and his or her intent regarding distributions will be helpful to a trustee.  If a letter of wishes is admitted into evidence during a dispute, the letter could also prove to be compelling evidence for a judge reviewing a trustee’s exercise of discretion.

Can an LLC Survive the Death of the Sole Member?

by Carol Warnick

What happens when the sole member of an LLC dies without making provisions for succession?  Does the LLC automatically dissolve with the assets being forced to be distributed through the decedent’s estate?  Alternatively, is there some way for the personal representative to save the LLC and to assume the position of the sole owner during the administration of the estate, thus allowing time to figure out how to handle the ultimate distribution of the LLC?  When the decedent operates a viable business in a single member LLC, significant value can be lost to the estate if the LLC is dissolved upon the death of the sole member. 

Those of us in Colorado are fortunate enough to be operating under a statute that give us some flexibility.  Under Colorado law, if the operating agreement of the single-member LLC does not address the circumstances on the dissociation of the member the statute provides as follows:

7-80-701. Admission of members

(2) At any time that a limited liability company has no members, upon the unanimous consent of all the persons holding by assignment or transfer any of the membership interest of the last remaining member of the limited liability company, one or more persons, including an assignee or transferee of the last remaining member, may be admitted as a member or members.

There is no dissolution provided that the assignee appoints or becomes a member:      

7-80-801. Dissolution – time and notice of dissolution

(1) A limited liability company formed under this article is dissolved:

(c) After the limited liability company ceases to have members, on the earlier of:

(I) The ninety-first day after the limited liability company ceases to have members unless, prior to that date, a person has been admitted as a member; or

(II) The date on which a statement of dissolution of the limited liability company becomes effective pursuant to section 7-90-304.

If 90 days have elapsed since the sole member’s death, the LLC dissolves, but it may be resurrected pursuant to 7-90-1001 and 1002  (note that the assignee has the power to act on behalf of the dissolved LLC (7-80-803.3(2)). (“The legal representative, assignee, or transferee of the last remaining member may wind up the limited liability company's business if the limited liability company dissolves.”) It could also wind up by merging with a non-dissolved LLC which may continue the business of the dissolved LLC.

This means that if we have an estate where the sole member of an LLC which is operating a business dies with no provision for succession, the statute not only provides a way to keep the LLC (and thus the business) alive until the ultimate distribution of the LLC interests, but it even allows for reinstatement of a dissolved entity should the personal representative not act quickly enough.  This is a great advantage for personal representatives dealing with this particular situation in Colorado.   A growing number of other states are specifically addressing the dissociation of the last member, similar to Colorado, but almost no other states permit the reinstatement of a dissolved entity in this manner. 

(The author gives thanks to Robert Keatinge, her colleague here at Holland & Hart, for his insight and significant contributions not only to the LLC statutes in Colorado but for his assistance with the content of this blog.) 

Probate and Trust Issues in Colorado’s Upcoming Legislative Session

by Kelly Cooper

Colorado’s General Assembly will reconvene on January 8, 2014.  At this time, it appears that at least two probate and trust related issues will be the subject of debate by the Assembly.

The first is a proposed change to the Colorado Civil Unions Act that would permit partners to a civil union to file joint income tax returns if they are permitted to do so by federal law.  Under the current proposal being considered by the Colorado Bar Association, there would be changes to both the Civil Unions Act and Colorado’s income tax statutes.  This is partly in response to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 by the Internal Revenue Service, which permits married same sex couples to file joint federal income tax returns. 

The second is a proposal to codify a testamentary exception to Colorado’s attorney-client privilege.  The necessity and proposed scope of the testamentary exception are currently being discussed by a subcommittee of the Statutory Revisions Committee of the Trust & Estate Section of the Colorado Bar Association and will likely be discussed later this week at Super Thursday meetings.

The Colorado Supreme Court has previously recognized that the attorney-client privilege generally survives the death of the client to further one of the policies of the attorney-client privilege – to encourage clients to communicate fully and frankly with counsel.  The Colorado Supreme Court has also held that a “testamentary exception” to the privilege exists, which permits an attorney to reveal certain types of communications when there is dispute among the heirs, devisees or other parties who claim by succession from a decedent so that the intent of the decedent can be upheld.

Charities are Beneficiaries Too!

by Jody H. Hall, Paralegal

“No, you cannot have it.  The trust is a private document” – Well, maybe, but not to the exclusion of the beneficiaries, and I mean ALL of the beneficiaries, named in that testamentary instrument.

Prior to returning to Colorado a few months ago, I worked in the Legal Department for a national charity where the responsibility of my team (totaling more than 8 attorneys, paralegals and staff) was to represent the charity’s interests in trust and estate matters around the country.

Coming from a background as a trusts and estates paralegal for well-respected law firms, I was absolutely shocked at the number of times that attorneys or fiduciaries (both professional and individual) would respond in the negative to a request for a copy of the will or trust or financial information regarding the gift of which we had just received notice.  There seemed to be this prevailing attitude that, because we were a non-profit organization, we would simply take whatever we were given or what was left over and be grateful for it, even in large trusts or estates where the designated gift was a portion or entirety of the residuary estate.  Unfortunately there was not a consistent understanding that if Charity XYZ and Cousin Sue are each to receive one-half of the residuary estate, they need to be treated equally.

Most charities do not intend to be adversarial or difficult.  Any money spent on legal fees reduces the ultimate charitable gift of the donor; however, they have a fiduciary obligation to the ultimate beneficiaries of their particular mission to ensure they receive everything to which they are ENTITLED!  In Colorado, that means a copy of the terms of the trust which affect the interest; other jurisdictions require a complete copy of the instrument, including codicils and/or amendments.  Almost every jurisdiction requires providing at least some information about the assets or accountings.

As with many things in life, upfront communication is usually the best policy.  My experience working for a “professional beneficiary” has reinforced and taught me several things about good estate and trust administration communications.  Provide an initial notification as soon as possible at the beginning of the trust or estate administration.  Provide periodic updates.  If there are assets that may take some time to sell, litigation or any other factors that may delay the distribution, let your contact know and they will calendar their system accordingly.  I know that I was less likely to question or challenge things when I received regular contact from the attorney or fiduciary.

So if the Decedent has been deceased for several years and you are just now sending a check for several hundreds of thousands of dollars as their first notification of the gift under a will or trust, do not be surprised if the charity requests additional information (including, but not limited to, the testamentary documents, an inventory or list of assets and an accounting) before signing a waiver or release.  After all, charities are beneficiaries too!

Dangers in Charitable Giving – Colorado’s Attorney General Takes Action Against Charities

by Kelly Cooper

Normally, when the topic of charitable giving comes up with a client, the discussion is a positive one.  The client is excited about the great work being done by a charity, wants to ensure that their charitable work is continued after their death or has a desire to create a legacy.  However, when representing clients that are fiduciaries who are making distributions for charitable purposes, a danger lurks – donating money to a corrupt or fake charity.

This danger was brought to the forefront last week in Colorado when Attorney General John Suthers filed suit against Boobies Rock! Inc., the Se7ven Group, Say No 2 Cancer and owner Adam Cole Shryock.  In the lawsuit, the Attorney General has claimed that these charities deceived consumers into thinking they were donating money to a cancer-related charity when consumers were actually giving money to a for-profit business that provided only small amounts to charity.  Allegedly, the charities would hire models to take donations on behalf of Boobies Rock! at various venues and events and tell people that their donations would go to other charities fighting breast cancer.  The Complaint filed by the Attorney General also alleges that these charities used the names of other legitimate charities in its fundraising efforts without their consent and that Mr. Shryock used a portion of the funds collected to pay for an online dating service, buy a BMW, pay for his cleaning service, and pay his bar tabs.

This is a harsh example, but is a good reminder to counsel clients to thoroughly investigate any charity they wish to give to and any charitable solicitation they receive.  To read the Complaint filed by the Attorney General, click here.

Payment of College Expenses for Beneficiaries – To Pay or Not to Pay?

By Kelly Cooper

Fiduciary clients regularly ask me what expenses can be paid out of a trust.  Generally, this requires an examination of the terms of the trust and the applicable law.  However, even after considering the terms of the trust and applicable law, trustees are often stuck in this grey area trying to determine what expenses may be paid.  As a result, I am always on the lookout for cases that might provide guidance for trustees in exercising their discretion.  Recently, a case from New York caught my eye.  Matter of McDonald, 100 A.D. 1349 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012).

In this case, the grandfather created a trust for his twin granddaughters and appointed his daughter (the twins’ mother) to serve as trustee.  As trustee, the mother refused to pay for the twins’ college expenses and to purchase a car for their use.  The twins filed suit and asked the court to remove their mother as trustee and to award attorney fees.

The trial court removed the mother as trustee, bypassed the named successor trustee and appointed an attorney (who was not named in the trust) to serve as successor trustee.  The trial court found that the mother had failed to observe the terms of the trusts and had abused her fiduciary responsibilities and awarded attorney fees to the twins.  The mother appealed and the trial court was unanimously reversed.

In reversing and finding in favor of the trustee, the appellate court cited to Section 50 of the Restatement of Trusts and identified the following factors:

The terms of the trust.  The relevant terms of the trust were stated as follows: “[t]he Trustee shall pay or apply to or for the use of each such living grandchild of mine so much of the income, accumulated income and principal of such share at any time and from time to time as the Trustee deems advisable in [the Trustee’s] sole discretion not subject to judicial review, to provide for such grandchild’s maintenance, support, education, health and welfare, even to the point of exhausting the same.”  The trust also provided for fractional distributions to the twins at ages 30 and 32 and termination of the trust at age 35.

Other resources.  The court noted that one of the twins’ college expenses were paid in full by public benefits and that the other twin had failed to even complete the necessary applications for public college benefits and tuition assistance.  Further, the twins both had New York 529 College Savings accounts and the balances in those accounts were sufficient to pay college expenses.

Friction.  The appellate court noted that there was friction between the mother and her teenaged daughters, but found that mere friction or disharmony between a trustee and a beneficiary is not sufficient grounds to remove a trustee.   The appellate court quoted another New York case, stating, “If it were, an obstreperous malintentioned beneficiary could cause the removal of a competent trustee through no fault on the latter’s part.”

Trust Protector As A Fiduciary – To Be Or Not To Be

by Carol Warnick

As the use of trust protectors has become more and more popular, one issue continues to surface. That is the question of whether or not a trust protector is a fiduciary or can be insulated by the trust language from being a fiduciary. It is an important question because of the duties and potential liability that could be imposed on a trust protector who is considered a fiduciary.

To set the stage, a brief discussion of trust protectors in general is in order. Some trace the beginnings of the concept to the world of off-shore asset protection trusts. Others point to thoughtful estate planners in the early 1980's who were trying to create flexible or "amendable" irrevocable trusts. While its origin is interesting, what a trust protector can and does do is obviously more important. A trust protector is a person who holds a power that when invoked is able to direct the trustee in matters relating to the trust. The power can be either a negative one or a positive one. It would be negative if it was merely the power to stop or veto some proposed action the trustee wanted to take. It would be positive if it allowed the trust protector to take action proactively, such as the power to add beneficiaries, remove or replace trustees, or even amend or terminate the trust.

Is it too trite or "lawyerly" to answer the question regarding whether or not a trust protector is a fiduciary by stating it depends? Alexander A. Bove, Jr., in his thoughtful article, "The Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic Pet?"1 believes that the answer to the question depends not only on what the powers are that are given to the trust protector but also the identity of the trust protector. One example he gives is that of the settlor's daughter being named the trust protector and being given the power to add or delete beneficiaries. Pursuant to the power, the daughter deletes her siblings and adds her husband and children. Bove argues that in such a case, the settlor would have contemplated such action by his daughter and so the power should be considered a personal, not a fiduciary power. By contrast, however, Bove states that if the same power were given to the settlor's attorney as a trust protector, and the attorney deleted the settlor's children and added his own, it would be considered an inappropriate use of the power because it was clearly not what the settlor would have had in mind. Thus, the same power given to the settlor's attorney could only be exercised in a fiduciary capacity because he would clearly have to bear in mind the purpose of the trust and the settlor's intent.

Powers such as the power to remove and replace trustees, power to change situs of the trust, and certain types of powers to amend the trust are more likely to be powers held in a fiduciary capacity.

Some state legislatures have jumped into the fray with statutes that attempt to give direction on the question. For example, in Wyoming, 2 the trust protector would likely be considered a fiduciary. In Alaska, the statutes provide that the trust protector has no fiduciary responsibility when performing the functions of a trust protector 3.

Absent state law on the subject, as is the case in Colorado and most other states, the question will likely ultimately be resolved by thoughtfully considering both the choice of the trust protector and successor trust protectors, as well as the effect of the particular powers granted to the trust protector. Bove suggests that, as a general rule, if the trust protector is the object of the settlor's bounty, and there is no language in the trust to suggest otherwise, then the power is probably held in a personal capacity. However, he goes on to state that if the trust protector is someone who serves in an advisory capacity to the settlor – not someone the settlor would likely name as a beneficiary – then the power will likely be held in a fiduciary capacity.

There is, however, a school of thought that holds (or perhaps hopes) that simply stating in the trust document that the trust protector will not be considered a fiduciary will settle the issue. Bove states that such an analysis is like saying "regardless of what type of animal walks through these gates, it will be deemed to be a horse." He vigorously argues that despite such language that may be included in a trust document, most trust protectors are intended to exercise their powers for the benefit of the trust, and as such can't escape the reality that comes with it.

The debate is far from being over. More states are likely to pass statutes relating to the question. Since the use of trust protectors, especially in long-term trusts, is increasing exponentially, the issue will be coming before judges who will be asked to rule on the issue. In the meantime, it behooves all of us who may be either drafting trusts with trust protectors, helping administer trusts where there are named trust protectors, or litigating trusts where such powers are involved, to not only consider the issue ourselves but to also discuss it thoughtfully with our clients.


1Bove, Alexander A., Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic Pet? , Estate Planning, Vol. 30, No 8 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, August 2003).
2"Trust protectors are fiduciaries to the extent of the powers, duties and discretions granted to them under the terms of the trust instrument." W.S. § 4-10-711.
3 “Subject to the terms of the trust instrument, a trust protector is not liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary because of an act or omission of the trust protector taken when performing the function of a trust protector under the trust instrument.” AS Sec. 13.36.370(d).

No Contest Clauses in Trusts and Powers of Appointment: Is Colorado’s Silence an Oversight or an Opportunity?

by Kelly Cooper

With the increasing diversity in the make up of today’s families, many estate plans now treat family members differently or disinherit certain family members completely.  When there is unequal treatment or a disinheritance, estate planners often include no contest clauses in their documents to try to avoid costly disputes and litigation after a client’s death.  Under Colorado law, a no contest clause is only enforceable against a beneficiary if the beneficiary lacked probable cause to bring a contest.  An in-depth discussion of these clauses and the probable cause exception to enforceability was posted to our blog last week, to read it, click here.  We expect the use of these clauses to increase and for clients to request these clauses as they become more familiar with them through media reports about the use of them in celebrities’ estate plans (e.g. Michael Jackson, Brooke Astor).

The topic for today is whether a contest clause in a trust agreement is subject to the same probable cause exception as a contest clause contained in a decedent’s will.  Since a revocable trust is considered a will substitute, some will argue that there is no compelling reason to treat a contest clause in a revocable trust any differently than one in a will.  While Colorado’s probate statutes are clear that a probable cause exception exists for contest clauses in wills, Colorado’s trust statutes do not contain any similar provision.  Is this silence an oversight or an opportunity for planners?  

Colorado’s silence on the question of contest clauses in trusts made me wonder how many states had statutes addressing contest clauses in trusts (enforceability and/or exceptions to enforceability).  The answer is thirteen (and is found in a great 2012 State Laws Survey cited at the end of this post) – Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Texas.  According to the survey, another nine states have case law addressing the question of the enforceability of contest clauses in trusts, but Colorado and twenty-five states have no statute or case law on this issue.  The Uniform Trust Code is also silent on whether contest clauses in trusts are enforceable.  In light of the fact that numerous states have already addressed the issue of contest clauses in trusts, it can be argued that Colorado’s silence is purposeful.

Colorado law is also silent on the issue of a decedent can place a condition on the exercise a power of appointment.  For example, a decedent’s will may state that he exercises a power of appointment to give assets equally to A and B if no contest is filed, but that he exercises the power to give all of the assets to A if B files a contest.  While this is a conditional exercise of the power of appointment, it reads very similarly to a contest clause.  Unlike revocable trusts, which are often will substitutes, a power of appointment is not a will substitute and the argument that a power of appointment should be treated like a will may well fall short.  In addition, powers of appointment are generally exercisable in regard to trust assets, not probate assets.  Here, Colorado’s law silence on the enforceability of contest clauses in trusts may provide a real opportunity to avoid the probable cause exception, but also causes uncertainty for fiduciaries and administrators of trust assets subject to powers of appointment.

In light of the uncertainty in this area, planners may want to consider drafting trusts instead of wills for those clients who wish to include contest clauses.  When possible, planners may also want to include powers of appointment to allow for greater flexibility and to assist their clients in exercising powers of appointment to implement any plan of unequal treatment among beneficiaries.

For more information about the differing state laws in regard to contest clauses, see a great survey “State Laws: No-Contest Clauses,” T. Jack Challis and Howard M. Zaritsky, March 24, 2012.